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Forensic Rhetoric and Irving Younger
John E. Simonett*
Rhetoric, as part of our vocabulary, has fallen into disuse,
even disrepute. The word has a musty, pedantic sound to it. To
characterize an argument as "mere rhetoric" is to dismiss it.
Yet well into the eighteenth century rhetoric was consid-
ered a necessary accomplishment of the public citizen and the
lawyer. Early American lawyers considered Cicero, the great
rhetorician, their role model. Rhetoric was part of the classical
educational curriculum of the Middle Ages, tracing its roots
back to ancient Greece and Rome. The classicists recognized
rhetoric as the "faculty of observing in any given case the avail-
able means of persuasion;"' but they recognized it as much
more than that, too. Rhetoric was also eloquence in public, per-
suasion employed in the public forum on issues of public mo-
ment.2 Rhetoric, fully understood, was the process by which
the commonweal conversed with itself.
Ideas of eloquence have changed, of course. The ornate or-
atory of yesteryear, with which we frequently identify rhetoric,
sounds, to the modern ear, ludicrously inflated. But this is only
an accident of style easily remedied. The essence of rhetoric as
persuasive public discourse remains valid. Indeed, if anything,
rhetoric is even more needed in today's public forum. Forensic
rhetoric, perhaps to distance itself from the excesses of modern
political rhetoric, chooses to speak of the art ofpersuasion and
the art of advocacy. These are perfectly good terms, but they
lose, it seems to me, the added dimension of honorable public
service inherent in the more traditional term. As a conse-
quence, the lawyerly art of persuasion tends to be downgraded
in legal education as well as in the eyes of the public, to the im-
poverishment of the profession.
When asked to explain rhetoric, Irving Younger, in one of
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Minnesota.
1. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC AND POETICS, Book 1, Ch. 2, 24 (F. Solmsen ed.
1954).
2. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 684, 684-702 (1985).
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his columns, quoted Claudio speaking of his sister Isabella in
Measure for Measure:
She hath prosperous art
When she will play with reason and discourse,
And well she can persuade,3
For Professor Younger, rhetoric was the "prosperous art"
that ennobled the profession of law.4 "[Tjhe word 'rhetoric,"'
he wrote, "properly used, denotes qualities both honorable and
indispensable to lawyers."5
Note the qualifying phrase, properly used. In many ways,
it seems to me, Irving Younger's career represents an effort to
refurbish and restore rhetoric to its classical meaning and
rightful importance. In so attempting, he did much to instill in
the trial bar standards of excellence and pride in its calling.
This essay explores briefly Professor Younger's contributions to
legal education as a forensic rhetorician.
L RHETORIC
Rhetoric, it bears repeating, is a public activity. It takes
place in a public forum and the courtroom represents the most
important public forum for resolving public issues. "'I have no
wish to shine as an orator,' said K., having come to this conclu-
sion, 'nor could I if I wished. The Examining Magistrate, no
doubt, is much the better speaker, it is part of his vocation. All
I desire is the public ventilation of a public grievance."'" 6
Although K.'s fate was otherwise, Kafka's point was that
once a grievance reaches the courtroom, even the faceless state
acquires a face and the individual's concern becomes the pub-
lic's concern. In the United States, with its traditional depen-
dence on the law, not only private disputes but all great public
issues sooner or later become courtroom issues. Richard
Kluger, in his book on Brown v. Board of Education,7 writes:
American society thus reduces its most troubling controversies to the
scope--and translates them into the language--of a lawsuit. In no
other way has the nation contrived to frame these problems for a de-
finitive judgment that applies to a vast land, a varied people, a whole
3. Measure for Measure (I, iii, 188-90), quoted in Younger, Chains Re-
quired, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 131.
4. Id
5. Id
6. F. KAFxA, THE TRrAL 53 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans. 1937) (emphasis
added).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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age.8
In the courtroom, then, we conduct a public search for jus-
tice, but truth is never exhausted and justice is never disinter-
ested. If we as a people must judge, the assistance of the
lawyer as rhetorician is indispensable.
The courtroom trial creates a world of its own, its meteor-
ology dependent on the highs and lows of the contesting forces
of persuasion. On the bench is the judge;9 close by, the court
reporter. 0 In the witness stand sits, paradoxically, the wit-
ness;11 in the jury box sit the jurors.-2 Counsel are at the coun-
sel table' 3 with the parties nearby,14 and behind the rail are
observers, including that surrogate of the public, a news re-
porter.15 The lawyers have the task of orchestrating the proof
and the argument.
The verdict, it is said, announces the truth of this court-
room enterprise. But how can this be? Facts are kept from the
jury either by counsel coaching the witness ("don't volunteer
anything") or by the judge ruling on evidence ("objection sus-
tained"). The jury is told it need only find a claim more likely
8. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, Foreword at x (1976).
9. "... . justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the
genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit." ARISTOTLE, supra note 1,
at 83-84.
10. "Judge Taylor was on the bench, looking like a sleepy old shark, his
pilot fish writing rapidly below in front of him." H. LEE, To KILL A MocKING-
BIRD 175 (1960).
11. "Bryan took his seat on the hard, spindle-legged pedestal, began fan-
ning himself and faced his inquisitor." I. STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE
DEFENSE 457 (1941).
12. "Judge Coates said, 'A jury has its uses. That's one of them. It's like
a'-he paused. 'It's like a cylinder head gasket. Between two things that don't
give any, you have to have something that does give a little, something to seal
the law to the facts. There isn't any known way to legislate with an allowance
for right feeling." J. COZZENS, THE JUST AND THE UNJUsT 427 (1942).
13. "The advocate must acquire the art of being passionate with detach-
ment and persuasive without belief .... Indeed belief, for the advocate, is
something which is best kept in a permanent state of suspension. There is no
lawyer so ineffectual as one who is passionately convinced of his client's inno-
cence." J. MORTIMER, CLINGING TO THE WRECKAGE 95-96 (1982).
14. "'You may try, and try, and try again, Messrs. Dodson and Fogg,' said
Air. Pickwick vehemently, 'but not one farthing of costs or damages do you
ever get from me, if I spend the rest of my existence in a debtor's prison."' C.
DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS 535 (J. Kinsley ed. 1986)
15. "'.... But they also poke their noses into what concerns everybody.
This nose-poking isn't something you can turn on and off like electricity. If
you want the benefit of what journalists do, you must put up with some of the
annoyance of what they do, as well."' R. DAVIES, LEAVEN OF MALICE 132
(1954) (quoting the character Mr. Ridley).
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true than untrue. Even if told it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury also is told that absolute certainty is not re-
quired. And throughout the trial and on appeal, the court bal-
ances competing interests, seemingly comparing plums and
pears. Consequently, as James Boyd White observed, rhetoric
often is perceived either as cynical manipulation, an "ignoble
art," or "failed science."16
Rhetoric always has been suspect as a conjuring art. Law-
yers, it is said, twist facts, although they may be calling atten-
tion only to the different inferences legitimately to be drawn
from the facts. But merely because the art of persuasion can be
misused is no reason not to use it properly. Indeed, rhetoric is
intended to be used on both sides of a question, says Aristotle;
not to make people believe what is wrong, but to clarify the is-
sues and to refute what is false.' 7
The perception of rhetoric as failed science is understanda-
ble. Science seems so sure of itself, translating knowledge into
precise, quantifiable terms. Only when exact knowledge is un-
obtainable is the problem turned over to the rhetoric of law for
a less than perfect answer. Science diagnoses a patient as men-
tally ill. Is the patient, if released, dangerous to others? Sci-
ence does not know and refers the matter to law. "[R]hetoric,"
says Professor White, "is thought of as what we do when sci-
ence doesn't work."' s But, of course, scientific knowledge also
is based on its own set of contingencies and hypotheses. The
truth is never quite pinned down, whether in science or law,
but at times we must act as if it is. Although a simple mathe-
matic proof shows that parallel lines do meet, observes Profes-
sor Younger, the architect builds the skyscraper on the
assumption that they do not.19 He notes that: "Thus we learn
to adopt a conventional certitude, to act as though all were light
by blinking the shadow."20 Rhetoric, if properly used, no less
than science, provides us with the "conventional certitude"
needed to get the world's work done.
Rhetoric properly used means, first of all, that it is compe-
tently used. The lawyer must know how to winnow the facts,
how to cross-examine, how to use the rules of evidence, how to
sum up, how to do many things. It is not very difficult for the
16. White, supra note 2, at 684.
17. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 23.
18. White, supra note 2, at 687.
19. Younger, Professional Res-ponsibility, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 863, 864
(1977) [hereinafter Professional Reponsibility].
20. Id. at 863-64.
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lawyer to learn what these "how tos" are. Professional journals
and seminars pour forth an endless stream of advice on trial
tactics. Most of the advice is nothing new. Aristotle pretty
much said it all centuries ago. To impeach a witness, he tells
us, we should determine if "he is a friend or an enemy or neu-
tral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and any other
such distinctions.. .; 21 or in oral argument, he tells us, the or-
ator must "put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right
frame of mind."22
There is, however, a wide gap between knowing what is to
be done and doing it. The American Bar Association's Confer-
ence on Enhancing the Competence of Lawyers, in its 1981 re-
port, pointed out that there is a difference between competence
and performance.P A lawyer may know what to do but do it
poorly. It was the profession's good fortune that Irving
Younger early on saw this gap between competence and per-
formance and applied his remarkable talents to effecting a rem-
edy. In lectures to law students, and in demonstrations before
the practicing bar across the country, he insisted that compe-
tence be wedded to performance. It was true, he thought, that
all the world was a stage. In his talk on the "Ten Command-
ments for Cross-Examination," Professor Younger not only told
how to cross-examine, he showed how. In teaching the rules of
evidence, he employed vignettes showing that the purpose of
the rules was not to "keep evidence out," but to let the truth
in.24 In analyzing cases, he went behind the reported opinions
of the appellate courts. He went to the trial records and even
to personal interviews with trial participants to show how the
performance of counsel in imposing order on the facts and de-
fining the issues influences the final result.2 In short, Profes-
21. ARISTOTLE, suira note 1, at 86.
22. I1 at 90.
23. Enhancing the Competence of Lawyers, 1981 ALI-ABA COIVZITTEE ON
CONTINUING PROF. EDUC. 73-74.
24. Younger, The Rules of Evidence: Do They Affect Persuasion?, in PER-
SUASION: THs. KEY TO SuccEss Ir-T RIAL 44 (G. Holmes ed. 1977).
25. See (even better, listen to), e.g., L Younger, The Trial of Alger Hiss
(1988) (available in audio or video tape from the Professional Education
Group, Inc.); I. Younger, What Happened in Erie? A Probing Examination of
Erie v. Tompkins, (available in audio or video tape from the Professional Edu-
cation Group, Inc.). For Hiss, Professor Younger read the voluminous record
of both trials, including pretrial depositions. He tells the story based on the
record and quoting the participants. The lecture, among other things, is a pen-
etrating study of how forensic rhetoric shapes a welter of facts and inferences
into proof that persuades. In Erie, Professor Younger relies on the pleadings,
record, and briefs, as well as his correspondence with the plaintiff's lawyer
1989]
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sor Younger taught that rhetoric shapes law and that
competence depends on performance.
Rhetoric properly used must also be fairly used. In quoting
Dr. Johnson's pronouncement that "[a] lawyer is to do for his
client all that his client might fairly do for himself, if he
could,"26 Professor Younger stressed the word fairZy.27 How
can one represent a guilty client? One can, of course, because
society believes the better good is for the guilty to be repre-
sented. "The moral basis of advocacy," wrote Professor
Younger, "lies in the lawyer's obligation to speak for anyone or
anything, but always, I perceive, consistently with his own
honor, for the imposition of a moral obligation presupposes
some sort of moral worth in the subject of the obligation." 28
For the advocate, then, in weighing the moral imperatives, a
"personal honor compels him to draw a line beyond which he
will not go in supporting the client's cause."29
Not only is a personal sense of honor essential in advocat-
ing a client's cause, but it governs, too, the advocate's relation-
ship with other lawyers. The lawyer-to-lawyer relationship is
not so much governed by prescribed rules but by something
much more binding to a person of honor, namely, good man-
ners, or what Professor Younger tentatively called "eti-
quette."30 Ultimately, then, rhetoric competently and fairly
and the memoirs of the railroad's lawyer, to tell the story of Harry Tompkins's
lawsuit.
26. J. BOSWELL, JOURNAL OF A TOUR TO THE HEBRIDES WITH SAMUEL
JOHNSON 14, entry for August 15, 1773 (Yale ed. 1965), quoted in Professional
Responsibility, supra note 19, at 866-67.
27. Professional Responsibility, supra note 19, at 866-67.
28. Id. at 867.
29. Id at 867-68.
30. The word etiquette, wrote Professor Younger, though "inadequate to
convey the importance of the subject," nevertheless subtly suggests the rela-
tionship lawyers should have with each other. Professional Responsibility,
supra note 19, at 867 n.22. By etiquette, Professor Younger does not mean de-
portment, nor even proper ethical behavior, but, I think, something more that
expresses itself in civility. Compare Justice Frankfurter's thought that:
"Morals are three-quarters manners." H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REM-
INISCES 12-13 (1960). I have always been struck by how well Cardinal New-
man's definition of a gentleman describes what should be the lawyer-advocate:
He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair ad-
vantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments,
or insinuates evil which he dare not say out.... If he engages in con-
troversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the
blundering discourtesy of better though less educated minds; who,
like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mis-
take the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, miscon-
ceived their adversary, and leave the question more involved than
[V'ol. 73:805
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used depends on the advocate's good character (not to be con-
fused with belabored "sincerity").31
We have not yet rounded out the full concept of forensic
rhetoric. One other aspect remains.
I. RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
The law library of the early American lawyer consisted of
a few books on the shelf. There might be Blackstone's Com-
mentaries and not much else.32 The lawyer had no case re-
ports, no statutes, no hornbooks.33 Consequently, lawyers
turned to classical Greek and Roman writers and the eight-
eenth century political philosophers, and they relied in argu-
ment primarily on first principles and effective rhetoric.3 4 To
refer to a colleague as learned counsel meant not that counsel
was particularly learned in legal matters but learned gener-
ally.35 Advocates patterned their approach after Cicero, who
taught that citizenship has public responsibilities and that law-
yers, for whom rhetoric is a professional prerequisite, had an
obligation to exemplify and to promote the public good.36 The
trial bar during the first decades of our country's history also
had the stimulating opportunity to explain and to justify the
country's new form of republican government to the people.37
Professor Ferguson quotes Chancellor Kent, who declared that
lawyers were-" 'ex officio natural guardians of the laws' and
'sentinels over the constitutions and liberties of the coun-
try.' 2)38 Lawyers took these responsibilities seriously. They
considered themselves, noted Albert Beveridge, to be statesmen
and publicists of the government as well as lawyers, "having
deep in their minds the well-being of their Nation even more
than the success of their clients."39
they found it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too
clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief
as he is decisive.
J. NEWfAN, ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 181-
82 (1915).
31. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 24-25.
32. R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 66 (1984).
33. Id- at 66-84.
34. Id-
35. "In the generations from Hamilton to Webster general erudition over-
rode technical expertise as the primary source of professional identity." Id at
66.
36. Id at 74-77.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id-
39. IV A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 135 (1919).
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We see, then, that the art of forensic persuasion, when
placed in its classic traditional setting, acquires its legitimacy,
purpose, and authoritative force from its connection to the law.
This connection, however, has tended over the years to become
attenuated. The law library shelves are more than full now,
and as a consequence, forensic rhetoric has become more legal-
istic, relying more on the weight or bulk of legal authority and
less on first principles and general reasoning. Much law is now
practiced outside the public forum of the courtroom, thereby
leaving lawyers less aware of their Ciceronian obligations.
There is the danger that lawyers will settle into the role of be-
ing mere technicians, becoming tradespeople rather than coun-
selors at law, and leaving the public dimension of the law to the
six and ten o'clock television news bites. When forensic rheto-
ric loses its true moorings-when it is no more than an adjunct
to business and politics-it deteriorates into polemics, the art of
disputation for its own sake.
Irving Younger sensed, I think, that any malaise affecting
practitioners of the law was not a problem of economics or
technology but of the spirit. And how is the practitioner's spirit
to be revived? Burke said a lawyer sharpens his mind by nar-
rowing it. Irving Younger disagreed; the narrower the mind,
the duller. Advocates, if they are to be true to their calling, if
they are to give voice to the community's aspirations, must, he
thought, be familiar with literature, art, music, history, and phi-
losophy; they must think through to first principles. 40 Lawyers
must cultivate lucidity, candor, aesthetics, efficacy, and ele-
gance.41 Professor Younger quotes with approval Paul Freund's
remark "that a course in legal ethics be supplemented by visits
to the symphony and to the art museums. '42 Appellate judges,
he thought, would profit in writing their opinions by reflecting
on a Verdi opera or a Gogol short story.43 If a Younger lecture
was unabashedly alive, it was because the law is unabashedly
40. Thus, on freedom of speech, Professor Younger asks what if there
were no first amendment free speech guaranty? On what basis might free
speech then be defended? After reviewing the ideas of Milton, John Stuart
Mill, Bagehot, Dostoevsky, and Socrates, Professor Younger arrives at the idea
of sanctuary, a personal space where the state may not intrude. See Younger,
The Idea of Sanctuary, 14 GONZAGA L. REv. 761, 761-783 (1979).
41. I. Younger, In Praise of Simplicity (1988) (available on audio or video
tape from the Professional Education Group, Inc.).
42. 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS 569 (1975), quoted in Professional Responsibility,
supra note 19, at 866.
43. Younger, On Judicial Opinions Considered as One of the Fine Arts:
The Cohen Lectures, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 341-353 (1980).
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human in its impact. Every law makes an "environmental im-
pact statement" on the human condition with forensic rhetoric
drawing out and.delineating that impact.
James Boyd White has proposed a most fruitful thesis. He
suggests that law itself may be described as rhetoric, what he
calls "constitutive rhetoric."44 Law can be thought of, not as a
set of rules, but as a particular culture of argument, of people
talking to and about each other, making and remaking the com-
munity.45 Thought of in this sense, forensic rhetoric is not a
matter of technique; rather, "law is an art of persuasion that
creates the objects of its persuasion.146 Law then becomes an
aspect of legal rhetoric, and legal rhetoric is an activity creating
culture and community. 47 "And the view of law as constitutive
rhetoric," says Professor White, "should define the lawyer's
own work as far less manipulative, selfish, or goal-oriented
than the usual models, and as far more creative, communal, and
intellectually challenging. '48 Irving Younger, I think, would
applaud.
III. CONCLUSION
Aristotle pointed out that rhetoric has no subject, but
rather is the means by which any subject is presented.4 9 This
elusiveness explains why rhetoric is difficult to teach. It also
suggests, it seems to me, why so often legal education has diffi-
culty deciding what it should be.
In music education there has long been a tradition of
"master classes." Students- of piano, voice, or the cello, once
having achieved a measure of competence, take master classes
from an accomplished pianist, singer, or cellist, a master per-
former who is able to portray and convey the chemistry that
turns competence into artistry. Irving Younger's classes in fo-
rensic rhetoric were master classes in the law.
44. White, supra note 2, at 688. This Essay can only touch on Professor
White's intriguing thesis as described in his law review article, which, in turn,
is part of his forthcoming book Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Po-
etics of the Law. Id. at 684 n. f.
45. Id. at 690.
46. rd at 691.
47. Ird
48. Id. at 697.
49. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 24.
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